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On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence
Pablo Carnino
Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva
In a recent article, Fabrice Correia explores the project of reducing the notion of
grounding to that of essence. He then goes on to provide several candidate deni-
tions and test each of them against a number of objections. His nal take on the
situation is, roughly, that two of the denitions can handle all of the considered ob-
jections. e aim of this paper is to re-evaluate Correia’s conclusions in the light
of two sources of insights: Firstly, I will argue that one of the objections treated
by Correia has been somewhat underestimated, and that it still constitutes a threat
against denitions of grounding in terms of essence. Secondly, there are at least two
further objections that should be considered by the advocate of such denitions. As
I will show, one of them can be neutralized; but the other one is more serious and
suggests a clear dialectical edge to an operationalist denition.
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1. Introduction
A famous notion of metaphysics tells us what a thing is. Speaking of the as-
pects that make a thing the thing it is, or that determine its identity, amounts
to speaking about the essence of the thing in question. It is typically thought,
for instance, that Aristotle is both human and bearded. But while his being
bearded is not part of his nature, or essence, his being human is. Another
way to put this is to say that being human makes him the very thing he is.
e general idea behind this notion is that some properties of things are
more intimately attached to the thing than others. Note that none of these
considerations is meant as an attempt to fully dene essence. Rather, they
should serve to illustrate an intuitive understanding of the notion. I remain
neutral here on whether the notion of essence can be adequately dened or
analysed in terms of other notions and focus on how, given our supercial
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understanding and intuitions on what essence is, the notion may be used to
dene a distinct and also important notion of metaphysics.
Aperhaps less famous but recently very researchednotion ofmetaphysics
expresses the quite common philosophical idea that certain facts obtain in
virtue of other facts. For instance, it is oen said that moral facts obtain
in virtue of non-moral (or natural) facts. When one wonders which facts
obtain in virtue of which, one is wondering what grounds what.1 Much the-
orizing has been going on about the notion of grounding lately and the or-
thodoxy has it that the notionmust be embraced as a primitive, for it cannot
be analysed in terms of any other notion. is claim was put into question
by Correia (2013) in a recent article in which he presents a number of can-
didate denitions of grounding in terms of essence. In the end, he does not
ocially endorse any of them but he still claims that two of them are good
enough to resist all of the objections that he considers. I will argue that one
of the objections has been underestimated by Correia and that a reshaped
version of it is immune to Correia’s criticism. en I will raise two kinds
of objections that Correia does not consider, the rst one can seemingly be
resisted by the two denitions, as they stand. But, the second is more wor-
risome and, as I will suggest threatens one of the denitions more seriously
thus giving an edge to the other one.
Before getting to the heart of the denition, one might wonder: why at
all try to dene grounding in terms of essence? Letme provide some reasons
that suggest that such a project might be worth pursuing. Of course, those
are merely pro tanto reasons and should not be read as the premises of a
deductive argument aiming to establish that one ought to analyse grounding
in terms of essence.
e rst thing that suggests that the notions are connected is their re-
spective tie to metaphysical necessity. On the one hand, essence is systemat-
ically connected with necessity in the following way: if an object has a prop-
erty essentially, then it also has that property as a matter of metaphysical ne-
cessity. On the other hand, whenever x grounds y, the conditional ‘if x then
y’ holds as a matter of metaphysical necessity.2 at is, both notions enter-
tain a form of systematic connection with metaphysical necessity. Besides,
many metaphysicians have suggested one way or another, that grounding
is connected to essence. Very roughly speaking, it seems to me that these
philosophers are tempted by the idea that, provided one wants explanatory
chains to bottom out somewhere, statements of denitions, or essences, are
1 I will use ‘grounding’ in an articially narrow sense to target metaphysical grounding.
2 is claim about grounding, though oen assumed, has not gone entirely unchallenged.
For a discussion of it, see (Leuenberger 2014), and (Skiles forthcoming).
58 On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence
ideal candidates for such end points.3 Of course, this is quite distinct from
and does not entail the view that the explanatory claims in question should
be understood in denitional terms, i.e. that one should dene grounding
in terms of essence.
Here is yet another thought that supports the strategy of using essence to
understand grounding. Many cases of grounding seem to draw upon con-
nections between the respective natures of the properties involved. For in-
stance, there is a connection between the nature of redness and the nature
of coloredness, because the former is a determinate of the latter, which is a
determinable. Furthermore, that very connection seems to somehow lie be-
hind the systematic grounding claims whereby whenever an object is red, it
is colored because it is red, that is, the fact that it is colored obtains in virtue
of the fact that it is red. It goes without saying that accepting these system-
atic connections is not tantamount to endorsing a denition of grounding
in terms of essence. Kit Fine (2012, 80), for instance, accepts the links in
question and rejects any attempt of dening grounding in terms of essence.
However, if there is such a systematic connection, anyone rejecting the hold-
ing of a deniens-deniendum relation between the two notions should be
able to otherwise account for the pattern. Similarly, holding that knowledge
systematically entails belief and that neither knowledge nor belief should be
dened in terms of the other seems like a delicate position on the face of
it; unless of course, one can explicate why knowledge and belief are so tied.
Now let us leave general motivations in the background, and turn to the def-
initions at hand.
2. AWorking Denition
Before I introduce any denition, it is worth mentioning the distinction
between an operationalist view of grounding and a predicationalist view of
grounding. According to operationalists, grounding should ultimately be
expressed in terms of a sentential operator anked by sentential expressions,
as in: ‘Sam is sad because his brain is in such and such microphysiological
state’. On the other hand, predicationalists use a relational predicate anked
by terms for facts or propositions to express grounding, as follows: ‘e fact
that Sam is sad is grounded in the fact that his brain is in such and such mi-
crophysiological state’. An important dierence to be noted is that only the
predicationalists are committed to an ontology of facts, or the like.4 As we
3 Here are some of the papers in which links between essence and grounding are explored:
(Audi 2012), Dasgupta (Manuscript), (Fine 2012), Dorr (manuscript), the latter is not ex-
plicitly about essence but may easily be understood as exploring a notion in the vicinity.
4 Strictly speaking, the predicationalist grammar could be adapted to exploit propositions
instead of facts. But, as things stand in the relevant literature, it is paradigmatic of a com-
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will see, this may turn out to be quite important in the face of certain objec-
tions. us, even if the two denitions that I will be concerned with are, if
you will, the predicationalist and the operationalist faces of the same coin,
they are not necessarily on a par with respect to all objections. In particular,
I will suggest that the operationalist denition fairs better against one of the
persisting objections. In the mean time and for expository purposes, let us
start with the predicationalist denition:
Pde f f is grounded in fi , fii , . . .
i (def)
(i) fi obtains & fii obtains & . . . , and
(ii) It is part of the nature of f that: if fi obtains & fii obtains & . . . then
f obtains.
More prosaically: the fact f is grounded in the collection of facts fi , fii ,
. . . just in case the collection of facts fi , fii , . . . obtains and it is part of the
nature of f that if the collection obtains then so does f . A noticeable trait
of this denition is that it exploits cases of objectual essence that are some-
what dierent from the ones one might be used to. Indeed the object that
is considered here is no typical object, it is a fact, and one might be worried
that such peculiar entities do not have essential properties. My impression
is that such a worry is unjustied, for our intuitions about certain properties
of facts run quite similar to our intuitions about essential properties of other
objects. Take Aristotle for instance: as I said earlier, he is both bearded and
human but one of these properties seems to be more intimately connected
with the man, or so goes the essentialist intuition. Now take the fact that
Obama is the president of the United States: this fact has the property of be-
ing mentioned in this paper and the property of involving Obama but one
of these properties clearly seems more intimately connected with that very
fact. Indeed, it seems that if it failed to bementioned here it would still be the
same object, but if it failed to involve Obama it would no longer be the same
thing. us, there seems to be little reason to deny that facts have essential
properties once one welcomes facts as objects into one’s ontology and agrees
that objects have essential properties. As mentioned earlier, this does not
have to be the case for operationalists. e notion analogous to the essence
of a fact for the operationalist denition is what Correia (2013, forthcoming)
calls “alethic essence”. But I shall come back to it later: for the time being and
for clarity’s sake, working with the predicationalist denition will do.
It is not hard to see that some of the results of this denition will be
perfectly acceptable by essentialist’s standards. For instance, the very widely
mitment to facts. More on the distinction can be found in (Correia and Schnieder 2012).
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accepted thought that f grounds ( f or g) will entail that (i) f obtains, which
was already guaranteed by the factivity of grounding, and that (ii) it is part of
the nature of ( f or g) that if f obtains then so does ( f or g). If the disjunctive
fact is to have a nature, as I previously argued, the cited conditional seems
ideally built to gure in it. Indeed, it seems that ( f or g) would hardly be the
same fact if it were not such that if f where to obtain then it would obtain as
well; and of course, were it not the same fact, it would a fortiori not be the
same object either. To take another example, suppose the fact that Sam’s ac-
tionmaximizes utility grounds the fact that Sam’s action is right. Our deni-
tion would entail that (i) the fact that Sam’s actionmaximizes utility obtains,
which aswe saw is given by the hypothesis, and that (ii) it is part of the nature
of the fact that Sam’s action is right that if the fact that Sam’s action maxi-
mizes utility obtains then the fact that Sam’s action is right obtains as well. I
do not think there is any problem with this, once granted the quite contro-
versial assumption that facts about an action’s being right are grounded in
facts about utility maximization in the way that we assumed here. Of course,
a similar examplewouldwork for any further and presumablymore accurate
way of specifying the grounds of rightness facts.
A kind of counter-example might come to the reader’s mind here. She
might say: what if there is a world in which my action maximizes utility but
is not right? Onemight or might not want to grant such a possibility, be it as
it may, the case in question functions as a counter-example not just to (Pde f )
but to any necessitarianist understanding of grounding, that is, it threatens
grounding as it is most typically understood. e necessitarianist can dif-
fuse the threat in at least twoways: rst she can deny themere possibility of a
change in the normative without any change in the non-normative. Aer all,
such a possibility is contrary to the very widely accepted thesis according to
which the moral supervenes upon the non-moral.5 Secondly, she could also
deny that the maximization of utility by the action grounds—in the appro-
priate sense—the action’s being right. Here, she could rely on a distinction
betweenmetaphysical and normative grounding and say that the grounding
claim in question does not belong to the class of relations that we originally
set to analyse with our denition, i.e. metaphysical grounding.6
5 e thought here is not that supervenience of the normative upon the non-normative en-
tails grounding necessitarianism. But, merely that supervenience allows us to cast away the
problematic example at hand, i.e. one in which there are normative dierences without any
dierence in the non-normative.
6 Such a distinction is hinted at by Fine (2012), however this philosophical territory remains
relatively unexplored. And, as I said, my discussion focuses on metaphysical grounding, I
hence will not concern myself with the connection between the varieties of necessity and
the varieties of grounding relations.
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3. An Underestimated Objection
In his seminal “Guide to Ground”, Kit Fine (2012) puts forward several ob-
jections against dening grounding in terms of essence.
One of them runs basically as follows, for any object x that exists at a
time:
(A) It is part of the nature of x that x exists simpliciter i x exists at a
time
eworry being that (A)would presumably, given (Pde f ), entail a case of
symmetric grounding, whereby the fact that x exists at a time would ground
the fact that x exists simpliciter and vice versa.7 But, as Correia rightfully
points out, the alleged result of symmetric grounding that Fine want to use
as a reductio does not follow fromhis remark (A), nor does it follow from (A)
combined with our Pde f . Indeed, the objection requires two further claims:
(B) It is part of the nature of the fact that x exists simpliciter that if the
fact that x exists at a time obtains then the fact that x exists sim-
pliciter obtains.
and
(C) It is part of the nature of the fact that x exists at a time that if the
fact that x exists simpliciter obtains then the fact that x exists at a
time obtains
that do not follow from (A). Clearly, (A) is an essential attribution about
x itself, while (B) and (C) are essential attributions about two distinct facts
involving x. Once that has been noticed it is hard to see how (B) and (C) can
follow from (A), as a matter of fact they do not. Correia presses the point by
showing that the more general principle that allows inference from
(Ga) it is part of the nature of x that F(x) i G(x)
to
(Gb) it is part of the nature of the fact that F(x) that if the fact that G(x)
obtains then the fact that F(x) obtains
7 Cases of symmetrical grounding are problematic given that grounding is widely taken to be
an explanatory connection and that explanations are typically asymmetrical. One typically
wants to avoid simultaneously endorsing claims of the form ‘p because q’ and ‘p because
q’. On a more authoritarian note, almost every single grounding theorist takes the notion
to be asymmetrical, Correia and Fine included. Wilson (2014) and Rodriguez-Pereyra
(forthcoming) are notable exceptions here.
62 On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence
and
(Gc) it is part of the nature of the fact that G(x) that if the fact that F(x)
obtains then the fact that G(x) obtains
has counterexamples. e one he gives is based on a version of the Aris-
totelian view of universals according to which it is part of the nature of hu-
manity that it exists if and only if something exemplies it. His suggestion is
that one can maintain, consistently with this, that it is not part of the nature
of the fact that something exemplies humanity that if the fact that human-
ity exists obtains then the fact that something exemplies humanity obtains
as well. On the face of it, Correia is simply right, to wit, one can consistently
maintain the “Aristotelian” instance of (Ga) and reject the corresponding
instance of (Gc). In sum, Fine was either tacitly relying on a false principle
(that is, (Ga)), or he was simply drawing conclusions that do not follow from
his premises.
However, as I will show here, in order for Fine’s objection (or a version
thereof) to work, no general principle is really required. All that would be
needed, given (Pde f ), is two claims that are instances of (B) and (C), call
them (Bi) and (Ci). My impression is that many such pairs of claims are
rather plausible and Fine probably had at least some of those in mind when
he formulated the objection.8 Take, for instance:
(Bi) It is part of the nature of the fact that Aristotle exists simpliciter that
if the fact that Aristotle exists at a time obtains then the fact that
Aristotle exists simpliciter obtains
and
(Ci) It is part of the nature of the fact that Aristotle exists at a time that
if the fact that Aristotle exists simpliciter obtains then the fact that
Aristotle exists at a time obtains
even if (Bi) and (Ci) do not follow from any general principle, one could
take them to be independently plausible, at least much more so than (B)
and (C). Part of the diculty with this objection lies in the blurriness of our
essentialist intuitions regarding certain facts. Indeed, when asked whether it
is part of the nature of the fact that Aristotle exists simpliciter that if the fact
that Aristotle exists at a time obtains then the fact that Aristotle exists at a
8 However, there is historical evidence that he did not, since he simply conceded when I pre-
sented him Correia’s rebuttal of his objection at the Kit Fine Conference (Varano Borghi,
summer 2013). But I do not wish to dwell on exegetical matters here, my point is sim-
ply that the objection can be made stronger than the one that Correia (2013, 285) “[Is] not
impressed about [. . . ].”
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time obtains, one most naturally experiences uncertainty about the issue at
hand; the case seems everything but clear here. Ironically, the essentialist’s
best response here might be that our intuitions regarding essences of facts
are—in this case—too elusive.
It is clear, on the other hand, that provided (Pde f ), (Ai) and (Bi) together
would entail that the fact that Aristotle exists at a time is grounded in the fact
that Aristotle exists simpliciter and vice versa, which is unacceptable for rea-
sons I mentioned earlier. I do not claim to have provided sucient support
to establish that a version of Fine’s objection actually holds. Rather, I hope
to have shown that the objection, or a version thereof, is more serious than
it has been thought to be. I will now turn to two kinds of new objections,
the rst kind relies on counter-examples drawn from the debate on ground-
ing necessitarianism and the second consists in taking (Pde f ) to be viciously
circular.
4. A Contingentist Objection
e class of objections that I want to consider in this section have not been
raised or discussed by Fine or Correia.ey belong to the debate on the con-
nection between grounding and necessity. A not so surprising consequence
of dening grounding in terms of essence is the thesis oen referred to as
necessitarianism about grounding:
(Nground) If f is grounded in fi , fii ,. . . , then as a matter of metaphysical
necessity:
( fi , fii , . . .→ f )9
Indeed, if links of grounding originate in the nature of facts, it is most
obvious that these links will hold as a matter of necessity. Allow me to
briey remind the reader here that although Fine famously argued against
the modal analysis of essence by arguing that necessity is not sucient for
essence, he still thinks, alongwith the vastmajority of proponents of essence,
that essence is sucient for necessity. us, (Pde f ) entails (Nground), and if
there are cases of contingent grounding, those ipso-facto constitute counter-
examples to (Pde f ).10 What I take to be the most convincing case for contin-
gent grounding comes from accidental generalizations.11 Take the fact that
9 Of course, necessitarianism is a view about the notion of full-grounding. No one thinks
that partial grounds necessitate. Take the fact that p: it partially grounds the fact that p∧q,
but this does not entail that p → (p ∧ q).
10 And to its operationalist counterpart.
11 ese, alongwith other counter examples of a similar kind, were put forward and defended
in (Skiles forthcoming).
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the tallest member of the Geneva department of philosophy is less than two
meters tall, call this fact ‘ f1’, for short. It seems quite natural to think that:
(Agen) f1 is grounded in individual facts fi , fii , . . . about the respective size
of each members of the Geneva department of philosophy
or at least, so the objection goes.
Consider now a (not so) nearby world in which former basketball player
Shaquille O’Neal is also a member of the Geneva philosophy department.
e individual facts fi , fii , . . . that grounded f1 still obtain, but f1 does not
anymore. For, the new tallest member of the department, Shaquille O’Neal,
is taller than twometers. Otherwise put, it is possible that there be someone
taller than two meters in the department, i.e. that f1 does not obtain while
fi , fii , . . . all obtain. (Pde f ) together with (Agen) entails that it is part of the
nature of f1 that: if fi , fii , . . . obtain then so does f1. But, if such a conditional
is part of the nature of an object it should hold as a matter of necessity, as
I just showed, it does not.12 Hence it is not. is given (Pde f ) suggests that
(Agen) is not grounded in the collection of facts about the respective size of
the members of the actual department, contrary to our intuition. It is not
too hard to see that many such objections can be created out of accidental
generalizations of all sorts, which renders even more pressing the need for
an answer.
A perhaps petty way to treat this objection is simply to say that, anyway,
most grounding theorists are necessitarianists and that, besides, so is Fine
who is the main opponent of (Pde f ). He appears to be in no position to
appeal to this kind of counter-examples without losing more than he stands
to win, so to speak. Still, given that (Pde f ) may have contingentist opponents
and given how hard it is to know whether Fine would rather give up on
necessitarianism than lose a potential counter-example to (Pde f ), I nd it
healthier to provide another way around the contingentist’s counterexample.
e secondway of replying to the contingentist is to say that the grounds
cited in (Agen) are merely partial grounds. And that the notion that (Pde f )
denes is one of full grounds. In other words, something is missing in order
for the facts fi , fii , . . . about the respective sizes of themember of the depart-
ment to fully ground f1. One could be sceptic with respect to the idea that
(Agen) only constitutes a partial explanation.13 Indeed, in cases of partial
12 If one, as is oen done, conditionalizes the modal implications of the essential claim here,
to the obtainment (or existence) of the corresponding fact, the conditional will not have
to hold as a matter of necessity, but merely at each world where the fact obtains (or exists).
However, this is of little importance since the counterexample will work indierently.
13 I am tacitly relying on the widely accepted view that grounding is tightly connected with
explanation. In particular, I exploit a principle according to which if x grounds y then x
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explanation, there is typically a part of the explanandum that remains unac-
counted for. Suppose that I want to explain the fact that Kit Fine is a British
philosopher and I cite the fact that Fine is a philosopher. It is clear enough
that I have given only a partial explanation for the target fact. One way to
conrm this is by noticing that a part of the explanandum, namely Fine’s be-
ing British, is le unaccounted for. Coming back to (Agen) one could answer
the claim that it involves only partial grounds by saying that there is no part
of the explanandum fact that is le unaccounted for in (Agen). I think that
such a response is na¨’ive for there is clearly a piece of the informative content
of f1 that is unaccounted for, although this may be less obviously so than in
the case of partial explanation that involved Fine’s being a philosopher. Sup-
pose I ask a child: “Who is the tallest kid of your class?” and she answers:
“I am 1.30 meters, Sam is 1.25 meters and Paul is 1.35 meters”. I will naturally
ask her if those are all the kids in her class. Only granted that information
would I have a complete explanation of the fact that Paul is the tallest kid of
the class. In sum, and coming back to our point, the part of the explanan-
dum that was unaccounted for is the fact that fi , fii , . . . are all themembers of
the department. Once this is added to the grounds of f1, however surprising
the possibility of Shaq O’Neal being a member of the Geneva department
of philosophy will not generate a counter-example to (Pde f ). For one of the
facts listed as grounds for f1 will simply not obtain at that strange nearby
world.
A notable problem with this response is that it commits us to a massive
amount of totality facts, such as the fact that Sam and Paul are all kids in
the class, the fact that a, b, and c are all the chairs in the room, the fact that
ai , aii , . . . are all the atoms that compose this chair, etc. Worse yet, a large
number of those facts will be fundamental, in the sense that they will not
be grounded in further facts. ese considerations are particularly serious
if one subscribes to something like Sider’s (2011) “purity principle” that says,
roughly, that only fundamental entities should be mentioned in fundamen-
tal facts.14 For it would make fundamental all the entities that inhabit these
ungrounded totality facts. So, many atoms, but also many (if not all) chairs,
and even philosophy departments would turn out to be fundamental furni-
ture of the world. It appears that the solution of totality facts may jeopardize
the project of neo-Aristotelian ontology, according to which what matters
in ontology is not what things there are but rather what fundamental things
explains y, in a specic sense of the word ‘explain’. ere might be room for a debate on
the view; whether it holds and how it should be cashed out exactly. But it is not my goal to
settle this question here.
14 Fundamental facts are simply the facts that are not grounded in anything.
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there are.15 Part of the issue here can be avoided simply by rejecting things
like the purity principle. One reason to give up on such a principle is that
identity facts, e.g. the fact that Sam is Sammight be ungrounded. Following
the purity principle and assuming that identity is reexive, i.e. that every-
thing is identical with itself; one would take everything to be fundamental.
Aer all, each thing is involved in a self-identity fact, failing to provide suit-
able grounds for facts of the form x = x would make every one of those facts
fundamental and along with them the entities that they involve, i.e. all enti-
ties.16 Besides, the idea that one will nd only fundamental things in funda-
mental facts seems to be derivative on themistaken idea that if a fact grounds
another fact then the entities involved in the former are more fundamental
than those involved in the latter. ere seem to be many cases where a fact
grounds another fact but the entities involved are exactly as fundamental. It
is tempting to say, for instance, that
1. e fact Sam is sad or Sam is happy is grounded in the fact that Sam
is sad,
and that
2. e fact that I am at least two meters away from you is grounded in
the fact that I am tree meters away from you.
But, since the very same things are involved in the grounds and in the
grounded fact, one would have to conclude that Sam is more fundamental
than itself, which is obviously nonsensical. Leaving aside links like the purity
principle, one (perhaps serious) worry remains with the proposed solution.
Namely, that it commits us to an extremely rich ontology of facts, and to
some quite peculiar, one might even say baroque, facts.
is is one important respect in which a predicationalist denition and
an operationalist denition of grounding are not on a par. Because the pred-
icationalist has to assume an ontology of facts while the operationalist does
not. Hence, the issue of an inated ontology of facts and of baroque facts
does not present itself or at least not in the same way for the operationalist.
Take the following operationalist denition of grounding in terms of essence
which is the straightforward operationalist counterpart of (Pde f ),
15 For more on such a project, see (Schaer 2009).
16 Of course, the view that identity-facts are ungrounded is a substantial metaphysical thesis.
And, as Skiles (personal communication) pointed out: one might say that if x is a non-
fundamental thing whose existence is grounded in facts about the ys, then the fact that x
= x is grounded in the fact that (i) everything that exists is self-identical and (ii) x exists.
One could claim that (i) is fundamental fact, albeit one that does not involve x; and if x is
non-fundamental, then (ii) is grounded in the relevant facts about the ys.
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Ode f p because pi , pii , . . .
i (def.)
(i) pi & pii & . . . , and
(ii) e following conditional is part of what it is for it to be the case
that p: if pi & pi i & . . . , then p.17
e denition exploits a new notion of essence that Correia (2012) calls
“alethic” which tells us what it is for it to be the case that blah—e.g. what it
is for it to be the case that Aristotle is human or it is sunny. is notion has
some intuitive appeal, indeed, it is quite natural to think that it is part of what
it is for it to be the case that Aristotle is human or it is sunny that: if Aristotle
is human then Aristotle is human or it is sunny. e notion at hand might
even run somewhat parallel to the notion of essence for a fact. Aer all,
when one wonders what it is for it to be the case that Obama is the president
of the United States of America, one might be aer something similar to the
essence of the fact Obama is the president of the United States of America.
A notable dierence is that the fact has the property of (perhaps even essen-
tially) being a fact, while for it to be the case that Obama is the president
of the United States of America does not seem to require that there be any
facts. In his discussion of the connection between essence and grounding,
Fine (2012) suggests that the notion of alethic essence can be made sense of,
without further characterizing it. Some comments on the notion are also
provided by Correia (forthcoming) in recent work, but the notion remains
mainly unexploited. Providing a detailed account and defense of the notion
in question falls outside the scope of this article. However, I hope that the
few things mentioned help give a rough idea of how such an account can be
developed. Be that as it may, I nd it interesting and fruitful to wonder what
metaphysical consequences the availability of such an account would have.
Given that a denition like (Ogen) does not commit us to an ontology
of facts, let us come back to the case of accidental generalizations and to
the use of totality facts to ground them. In the spirit of (Ogen), one can
perfectly take the operator ‘because’ to be anked by sentential expressions
that express propositions. is alternative grammar for grounding is free
of any commitment to facts and thus free of commitment to totality facts as
17 I should mention here that, as it stands, (Ogen) is not equipped to distinguish plural
grounds (e.g. p i , p i i) from conjunctive grounds (e.g. p i & p i i). Such a failure to discrimi-
nate would be problematic since one typically wants a plurality of propositions to ground
the corresponding conjunctive proposition, but not the conjunction to ground itself, for
grounding is irreexive. However, as Correia (2013) points out, this can be xed by slightly
tweaking the conditional that is used in clause (ii) of the denition. His response is at least
technically appropriate in that it delivers the right results.
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well.ose can be replaced by totality propositions or even sentences, in the
hope that they will be less gruesome from a metaphysical standpoint. Here
is, in a nutshell, why such a change leaves us in better shape, so to speak.
e present use of the words ‘fact’ and ‘proposition’ might be confusing to
philosophers who take facts to simply be true propositions. At any rate, the
distinction that matters here is the one between a merely conceptual entity
(like, for instance, Fregean thoughts) and a worldly entity (like, for instance,
Armstrongean states of aairs). Facts are literally speaking portions of the
world; propositions, on the other hand, are purely representational entities:
they present us the world as being such and such. Now having to accept
totality-facts prompts the question: what part of the world corresponds to
the fact that Sam and Paul are all the kids in the class? Is it the absence of
any other kid in that particular class; and if so, where is that absence exactly?
ese dicult questions and others seem to arise only for the ontological
category of fact. Indeed, there is nothing metaphysically mysterious about a
totality proposition in itself.18
What about the fact that many of those totality propositions will be un-
grounded? Is that problematic? Here are two reasons why one might think
that having many totality propositions without grounds is an issue: rstly,
one might want to hold on to some kind of purity principle for proposi-
tions according to which there are only fundamental entities in ungrounded
true propositions. I think that the considerations that I raised for rejecting
the factual version of the principle apply mutatis mutandis; secondly, one
might want to defend a special version of the principle of sucient reason
(PSR) according to which no proposition should be ungrounded. But in or-
der to be any better o, such a philosopher would have to show that she can
avoid having the true totality propositions at all, and this seems to be a rather
tricky task. Will she deny that Kevin Mulligan, Ghislain Guigon, . . . are all
the members of the Geneva philosophy department? at a1, a2, . . . are all
the chairs in the classroom? I can hardly see how one would go about doing
that. My preliminary conclusion here is that the contingentist objections, at
least the ones relying on accidental generalizations, can be avoided by (Ogen)
but not by (Pde f ). Given that other considerations apply quite similarly to
both denitions there is a general advantage to (Ogen), provided that the
appropriate essentialist notion can be worked out.
18 Of course, the truthmaker maximalist will encounter analogous issues accounting for the
truth of that proposition.
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5. Is the Denition Circular?
For the sake of grammatical simplicity I will present this objection as though
it concerned the predicationist denition. However, I am convinced that
both (Ogen) and (Pde f ) can escape the objection and that the corresponding
responses would be quite similar, enough so that I can aord to only present
one and let the reader extrapolate from there. e objection is the follow-
ing: the notion of being part of the essence of f that appears in clause two of
(Pde f )’s deniens is simply grounding under another guise.19 In other words,
what should be dened is in fact already present in what supposedly serves
to dene it. Indeed, the Finean locution for essential attribution “. . . true in
virtue of the nature of. . . ” is dangerously close to a very common way of ex-
pressing grounding relations, that is, the ‘. . . in virtue of. . . ’ connective (Fine
1994). However, Fine explicitly dismisses understanding the former in terms
of the latter:
Although the form of words ‘it is true in virtue of the identity of x’
might appear to suggest an analysis of the operator into the notions
of the identity of an object and of a proposition being true in virtue of
the identity of an object, I do not wish to suggest such an analysis.e
notation should be taken to indicate an unanalyzed relation between
an object and a proposition. (Fine 1995a, 284)
Leaving Fine’s exegesis on a side, even if, quite literally speaking, the se-
quence of words ‘true in virtue of the nature of ’ does contain the sequence
‘in virtue of ’, this—on its own—does not show that the notion referred to
by ‘in virtue of ’ when it is used to express grounding is at play in the no-
tion referred to by ‘being part of the essence of f ’ as it is used in (Pde f ) or
by essentialists in general.ere is at least one plausible way of understand-
ing the notion of being part of the essence of f which does not induce this
circularity. One might think that the essence of f is something like a set or
collection of propositions about f . ere would be the set of true proposi-
tions about f , perhaps also the set of necessary propositions about f , and
nally the set of essential propositions about f . According to this way of
understanding essence, what is part of it could either be a member of the set
or a proposition that is somehow derived from some propositions that are
members of the set.20 On such a conception of essence, there is apparently
no circularity. Besides, this is not far from Fine’s understanding of essence,
19 My thanks go to Kevin Mulligan for raising this objection.
20e derivation in question yields the “consequential”—as opposed to constitutive—essence
of the object. Fine (1995b) elaborates on this distinction. e details of the derivation at
play are subject to controversies, but they should not matter too much here. More can be
found on this in (Correia 2012).
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except that he puts emphasis on essence being a primitive connection be-
tween an object and some propositions whereby the later are true in virtue
of the nature of the former. But no matter what the primitive ideology looks
like in words, it connects one or more objects to one or more propositions.
With this in mind, one would probably understand being part of the essence
of f as being amongst the propositions qi , qii , . . . that are true in virtue of the
nature of f . Now the question remains: does ‘p is true in virtue of the nature
of . . . ’ express a grounding relation. ere are mainly two reasons to think
that the Finean locution does not express grounding. One is that the locu-
tion connects an object like Aristotle and a proposition, while grounding
connects facts with facts or propositions with propositions. And the second
is that grounding is an explanatory connection, while the essentialist locu-
tion connects an object with one ormore propositions, and an object cannot
possibly explain anything. At best, the object’s existing or some other propo-
sition about the object may play the role of grounds but not the object on its
own.21 Hence, our understanding of essence does not lead to the conclusion
that (Pde f ) is circular.
6. ConcludingWords
I hope to have cast some new light on the prospects of dening grounding
in terms of essence, at least as far as the two denitions that I presented are
concerned. I suggested that an objection that Correia had quickly dismissed
is much more serious than he might have thought. In addition, I tested the
results of two denitions against some new objections. It turns out that, if
they can equally handle the threat of circularity, the operationalist denition
is better suited to withstand the contingentist’s objection. is provides a
dialectical edge to the operationalist denition and, indirectly, an argument
in favour of operationalism about grounding.
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